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Can jinn be a tonic? The 
therapeutic value of spirit-related 
beliefs, practices and experiences
O jinn pode ser um tônico? O valor terapêutico das 
crenças, práticas e experiências relacionadas 
ao espírito
Anastasia Philippa Scrutton1
ABSTRACT
Religion and spirituality are increasingly associated with mental health, yet spirit-related 
practices, beliefs and experiences (SPBEs) are regarded with more suspicion. This suspi-
cion is misplaced, and worryingly so, since, I argue, it shuts down a potentially therapeutic 
avenue in relation to anomalous experiences such as hearing voices and sensing the pres-
ence of the dead. A presupposition of this argument is that anomalous experiences are not 
inherently pathological but can become so as a result of the way they are interpreted and 
reacted to. While this claim is not new in itself, I will provide a philosophical foundation for 
it by defending a ‘contextualist’ view of pathology in the context of anomalous experiences 
against ‘inherentist’ alternatives, according to which some or all instances of anomalous 
experiences are inherently pathological. 
Keywords: religion, spirituality, auditory hallucinations, psychosis, pathology, mediumship, 
schizophrenia, hearing voices, mediumship, spirit possession, healing rituals.
RESUMO
A religião e a espiritualidade são cada vez mais associadas a ganhos em saúde mental. No 
entanto, práticas, crenças e experiências espirituais são vistas com suspeita. Esta suspeita 
é preocupantemente errônea visto que ela interrompe uma via potencialmente terapêutica 
com relação a experiências anômalas, como ouvir vozes e sentir a presença dos mortos. 
Uma pressuposição do meu argumento é que experiências anômalas não são inerente-
mente patológicas mas podem tornar-se patológicas como resultado do modo como são 
interpretadas e como se reage a elas. Apesar de essa reivindicação não ser inovadora em 
si, forneço uma fundação filosófica para ela ao defender uma visão “contextualista” da pa-
tologia no contexto de experiências anômalas contra alternativas “inerentistas” de acordo 
com as quais há instâncias de experiências anômalas que são inerentemente patológicas.
Palavras-chave: religião, espiritualidade, alucinações auditivas, psicose, patologia, mediu-
nidade, esquizofrenia, audição de vozes, mediunidade, posse de espírito, rituais de cura.
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Introduction
While psychiatry has historically been antithetical to 
religion, numerous empirical studies over the last two de-
cades have sugge ed that religion and spirituality are posi-
tively associated with mental health. While separating cause 
from correlation is fraught with difficulties, there are indica-
tions that the relationship is in part causal: that religion and 
spirituality act as buffers during times of crisis and promote 
adaptive coping behaviours, giving rise to better mental health 
outcomes (Koenig et al., 2013). 
Against this general trend, spirit-related pra ices, beliefs 
and experiences (henceforth SPBEs) are often regarded less 
positively, both in this literature, and by we ern society more 
generally. Relatedly, anomalous experiences such as hearing 
voices without an external physical stimulus, or sensing the 
presence of the dead, have historically and in other cultures 
been made sense of in relation to SPBEs (e.g. mediumship, 
ance or veneration, and communication with spirit-guides). 
These are now instead frequently described in terms of psy-
chosis and regarded as symptoms of pathology. 
This paper will argue that the tendency to regard SPBEs 
negatively is problematic for both intellectual and pra ical 
reasons. It is intellectually problematic because it treats as ho-
mogenous a broad range of beliefs, pra ices and experiences. 
This has a range of causes including absence of familiarity, 
suspicion born of one-sided media portrayals, and cultural 
assumptions about what kinds of beliefs are intellectually ac-
ceptable, the roots of which include colonial and Enlighten-
ment supremacist myths. 
The tendency to regard SPBEs negatively is pra ically 
problematic because some SPBEs are therapeutic in relation 
to anomalous experiences, and so, by discouraging people 
from making sense of their experiences in these terms, nega-
tive assumptions shut down potentially therapeutic avenues. 
That some SPBEs can be therapeutic is indicated in part by 
recent psychological studies which pinpoint responsive and 
contextual factors associated with whether or not an anoma-
lous experience is interpreted as pathological (and treated in 
a clinical context). The responsive and contextual factors as-
sociated with non-pathological outcomes are common char-
a eristics of some SPBEs, and so there is reason to suppose 
that some SPBEs are therapeutic in relation to anomalous 
e xperiences.
A presupposition of my use of these psychological stud-
ies (and, in some cases, of these studies themselves) is a ‘con-
textualist’ view of pathology in the context of anomalous 
experiences – that is, that anomalous experiences are patho-
logically indeterminate, and that pathology is something that 
can emerge during the process of reception and interpretation 
of an anomalous experience, rather than being inherent in 
and necessary to the anomalous experience itself. Having giv-
en an overview of the psychological studies, I will support the 
contextualist view by arguing against two alternative inher-
entist explanations of the findings: (i) that the responsive and 
contextual factors mean the person remains undiagnosed, 
as distinct from non-pathological; and (ii) that the respon-
sive and contextual factors are correlates, rather than causes, 
of inherently pathological and inherently non-pathological 
states. The former more commonly involves the idea that all 
anomalous experiences are inherently pathological, while the 
latter often involves the idea that some anomalous experienc-
es are inherently pathological, and others inherently spiritual 
or mystical. In arguing against these inherentist explanations 
for the similarities and differences between pathological and 
non-pathological anomalous experiences, I will provide a 
philosophical basis for the contextualist claims found in my 
own and other discussions of anomalous experiences.
Terms and methodology
SPBEs is the term I will give to a broad range of prac-
tices, beliefs and experiences in which the concept of spirits 
plays a central part. These include spirit possession, both as 
this occurs voluntarily, as in the cases of mediumship, and 
involuntarily, as when a cure is sought through a healing rit-
ual. In addition to possession, SPBEs include a broader range 
of beliefs and pra ices, such as conversations and receiving 
help from spirit-guides. ‘Spirits’ may refer to a range of enti-
ties including the earth, animals and trees, where these are 
related to in particular ways (as in some forms of animism), 
essentially spiritual non-physical entities (such as orixas and 
angels), biological and spiritual ance ors (as in the cases of 
ance or veneration and the cult of saints), and family and 
friends who have died but who continue to interact with the 
human world.
As these examples show, both ‘SPBEs’ and ‘spirits’ are 
broad terms. They are also vague – for example, we could 
ponder whether Sue’s assertion that she believes in ghosts, or 
Fred’s claim to have been filled with the Holy Spirit, consti-
tute SPBEs or have spirits as their objects. Concerns might 
reasonably be voiced about whether, given this, ‘SPBE’ and 
‘spirits’ are in fact helpful terms (see Harvey, 2010, p. 28). I 
think they are, partly because ‘spirits’ is a term in common 
usage, and changing the connotations of words is usually more 
effective than creating new ones, but also because broadness 
and vagueness are advantages as well as disadvantages since 
they enable discussion of a wide-range of beliefs, pra ices and 
experiences. While using broad terms could tempt us gener-
alise about these, recognising that they are broad is a crucial 
antidote to this because it encourages us to analyse individual 
pra ices, beliefs and experiences on a case-by-case basis, and 
not to extrapolate from one form of SPBE to another – one of 
the concerns at the heart of the paper. 
‘Anomalous experience’ is also both broad and vague. It is 
an attempt to give a name to experiences described in psychi-
atry in terms of hallucination and psychosis, and in some re-
ligious traditions in terms of mystical or spiritual experience, 
without presupposing either pathology (on the one hand) or 
spiritual value (on the other). Of particular relevance to this 
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paper are hearing voices without external stimuli (henceforth 
just ‘hearing voices’), and sensing the presence of the dead. 
The latter may involve hearing, seeing, smelling or feeling 
the touch of someone who has died, or may simply involve 
a feeling that they are present without any physical sensory 
experience. Other terms attempting to be neutral that are 
sometimes given to these experiences in the context of dis-
cussions of spirituality and psychosis include ‘psychotic-like 
experiences’ and ‘out of the ordinary experiences’. I prefer 
‘anomalous experiences’ because ‘psychotic-like’ suggests that 
they are similar to psychosis but may in fact be inherently dif-
ferent in origin and potential, which is a conclusion I want to 
resist. ‘Out of the ordinary’ is better, but cumbersome, and it 
can also obscure the fact that some people, communities and 
cultures regard the experiences as quite ordinary. ‘Anomalous’ 
is far from ideal, since it seems to indicate that the experi-
ence doesn’t fit easily into our worldview, and this prioritises 
worldviews in which spirits do not play a significant part over 
those in which they do. However, I haven’t yet found a better 
alternative. Not all people involved in SPBEs have anomalous 
experiences, and not all people who have anomalous expe-
riences interpret them in terms of SPBEs. It is sufficient for 
this paper that some people, communities and cultures who 
have anomalous experiences make sense of them in terms of 
anomalous experiences, and that anomalous experiences are 
given a radically different interpretation and reception in 
these communities and cultures than they are by mainstream 
we ern society.
While there is no necessary relationship between con-
textualism and the idea that religious categories (e.g. SPBEs, 
spirit possession, religious experience, religion and spiritu-
ality) and psychiatric categories (e.g. pathology, psychosis, 
schizophrenia, mental disorder) are social kinds, it is diffi-
cult to  eak of such categories without implying that they 
are either social or else (essentialist) natural kinds, and I will 
presuppose that they are social ones. This is because attempts 
to find a (biological, phenomenological, or other) essence or 
substantive core of these categories has thus far been unsuc-
cessful, and so to  eak of them as natural kinds would seem 
to be to jump to some unsubstantiated essentialist conclusions 
(see Littlewood, 1997, p. 67; Dein, 2010). I will also presup-
pose that, far from entailing truth relativism, we can under-
take both descriptive and analytical projects with re ect to 
social kinds (see Haslanger, 2012, p. 222-224). In the context 
of this paper, the central descriptive project involves inquiring 
into whether pathology is contextual or inherent – in other 
words, whether the language of pathology tracks chara er-
istics that are essential to certain experiences, or develop as 
a result of responsive and contextual factors. The central an-
alytical project involves an evaluation of both religious and 
psychiatric ways of making sense of certain experiences, not 
in terms of an absolute culturally and historically objective 
truth, but in terms of intellectual and pra ical merit; or in 
Haslanger’s terms, by whether they serve cognitive and prac-
tical purposes (2012, p. 223). Intellectual or cognitive merits 
relevant to this discussion include coherence, fidelity to ex-
perience, simplicity, and intuitive plausibility, while pra ical 
ones include helpfulness and therapeutic potential.
Negative perceptions 
of SPBEs in the West
In the West, SPBEs are fraught with a variety of negative 
associations. For example, they are sometimes associated with 
the exploitation of the vulnerable by fraudulent pra itioners 
(Loewenthal, 2007, p. 28). Because of their association with 
anomalous experiences and therefore psychosis, engaging in 
spirit pra ices is also sometimes seen as a symptom of pa-
thology. As Stanley Krippner remarks, “It should come as no 
surprise that professional ‘mediums’ and ‘channelers’ in west-
ern societies often disguise or hide their a ivities for fear that 
the wider public will brand them as mentally ill” (Krippner, 
2007, p. 24). It is also usually presupposed that the experience 
of spirit possession is negative in the sense of distressing and 
undesirable, as in the depiction in The Exorcist. As Bettina 
Schmidt and Lucy Huskinson put it, “More often than not 
we ern interpretations of spirit possession have focused on 
those instances that imply pain and torment […] and not on 
those instances that imply joy and healing, or […] creativity 
and comedy” (Schmidt and Huskinson, 2010, p. 7-8). Media 
portrayals tend to emphasise cases in which spirit-related 
pra ices do serious harm to those being pra iced upon, as 
in the case of the Romanian nun Irena Cornici whose alleged 
‘exorcism’ involved her torture and subsequent death by her 
religious community (BBC, 2005). Such cases are highlight-
ed in the News, while positive experiences remain relatively 
unknown. In addition to these, while  eculation about, for 
example, ghosts and the paranormal are often the object of 
informal conversations, belief in spirits is often regarded as 
not really intellectually re ectable or inappropriate in the 
context of formal academic discourse. 
Various genealogies of negative perceptions of SPBEs 
could be traced. One includes the per ectives of early an-
thropologists who set the groundwork for later views of SP-
BEs (see Schmidt and Huskinson, 2010, p. 1-15). For example, 
in 1692, the Dutch explorer Nicolaes Witsen published the 
earliest known depiction of a Siberian shaman, which he enti-
tled ‘Priest of the Devil’ (Harvey, 2010, p. 24-26). This depic-
tion is typical of historical modern we ern mainstream per-
ceptions of SPBEs in (at least) three re ects. Coming from 
a certain kind of Christian context, it assumes (in this case 
erroneously) that spirits are evil, and associates spirit-related 
pra ices with the demonic. Taking place against the back-
drop of European colonialism and, in particular, a slave trade 
European culture was keen to justify, beliefs of other cultures 
are portrayed as, at best, primitive and inferior, and at worst 
pathogenic and exploitative, if not (as here) wholeheartedly 
diabolical. To remove someone from such a context is not, 
after all, to do them a disservice (see Johnson, 2011). In addi-
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tion to Christian and white supremacist beliefs, the Enlight-
enment belief that ‘objectivity’ is the only authoritative per-
 ective led to a dismissal of subjective or ‘emic’ per ectives 
about the nature of the experience, both at the expense of 
the phenomenology of the experience itself, and its meaning 
within the wider context of the experient’s life. 
These per ectives have had an abiding influence on 
mainstream interpretations of SPBEs. For example, the ‘ob-
jective’ per ective of the Enlightenment is evident in psychi-
atry’s ongoing attempt to objectively assess and treat mental 
illness, which renders the per ectives and, in particular, re-
ligious and spiritual beliefs of patients, of secondary impor-
tance (Durà-Vilà et al., 2011; Frank, 1997; Charon, 2008). In 
terms of persistent colonial attitudes, we might note the 1996 
example of the seventy-year-old Native American woman 
who was diagnosed with, and hospitalised for, schizophrenia, 
on account of the fact that she answered affirmatively when 
a psychiatrist asked whether she heard voices when she was 
alone (Krippner, 2007). In fact, the woman was a Native 
American healer whose vocation involved listening to the 
earth’s messages; had this been properly taken into account, 
such a diagnosis should not (by DSM-IV’s own criteria) have 
been made. That an otherwise sane-seeming person might be 
diagnosed on the basis of this may seem surprising, but is less 
so once one takes into account the cognitive bias by which, 
as experiments suggest, the fact of voice hearing having been 
revealed, other a ects of a person’s psychological history are 
judged (Rosenhan, 1973). This cognitive bias can ramify with 
pathologising presuppositions about certain forms of religious 
beliefs, and it is interesting for our discussion of SPBEs that 
studies suggest that it is unfamiliar religions, rather than fa-
miliar and mainstream but stigmatised religions (such as Is-
lamic groups), that are most pathologised both within psy-
chiatry and by the public ( Judd and Vandenberg, 2014). Such 
factors can also intersect with sex and age biases to produce 
forms of epistemic injustice in relation to particular experi-
ences (consider the diminutive connotations of the phrase 
‘little old lady’). Conscious or unconscious race, class, educa-
tion and accent prejudices are also common (Fricker, 2007; 
Carel and Kidd, 2014), and it is not difficult to imagine these 
playing a part in such cases. 
In addition to Enlightenment and colonial per ectives, 
due to unfamiliarity, mainstream Jewish and Christian beliefs 
are often projected onto other religious systems. Consider the 
following case:
Imebet is an Ethiopian immigrant to Israel 
with low mood. She had been given some 
antidepressants, but then frequently need-
ed hospitalisation for severe head and ab-
dominal pains. She said that these pains 
were caused by failing to receive her Zar 
and carry out his worship rituals appropri-
ately. When she was able to do this, she felt 
euphoric, wonderful. […] Her children were 
being cared for in foster day care, since she 
was (according to the social worker) spend-
ing most of her time ‘performing devil wor-
ship ceremonies and turning her apartment 
into a temple’ (in Loewenthal, 2007, p. 31). 
In fact, while sometimes causing illness, Zar (a kind of 
jinn or spirit) are not considered diabolical, and Zar posses-
sion differs from other possession beliefs because the per-
ceived solution is not to free the possessed person from the 
Zar, but to create an equilibrium such that the possessed per-
son can live at peace with the possessor (Bilu, 2003, p. 353). 
Lack of familiarity with these beliefs means that SPBEs like 
Imebet’s tend to have mainstream religious categories such as 
devil worship falsely imposed upon them. 
Why negative perceptions 
of SPBEs are intellectually 
problematic
Negative perceptions of SPBEs are problematic for in-
tellectual reasons, simply because they treat as homogeneous 
a diverse set of beliefs and pra ices. This homogenisation 
occurs in academic and mental health as well as popular dis-
course, often because of what is not said, rather than because 
of what is. This arises partly because empirical studies have 
a Christian (and Jewish), USA (and we ern Europe) bias in 
relation to mental health and religion. This is well-recognised 
by the researchers themselves; as Koenig et al. write:
More cross-sectional studies of the R/S [re-
ligion and spirituality] relationship are prob-
ably not needed. We now have hundreds 
of such studies, and resources should not 
be expended on discovering over and over 
again what is already known. This, howev-
er, does not apply to research in non-U.S. 
populations or in non-Christian populations 
where such studies are few in number or not 
yet done. Cross-sectional and qualitative 
studies are still needed in Jews, Muslims, 
Buddhists, Hindus, Chinese religions and 
New Age spiritual believers living in areas of 
the world where these faith traditions pre-
dominate, rather than in Western countries 
where they represent minorities in a largely 
Christian society (2013, p. 172). 
Hisham Abu-Raiya and Kenneth Pargament make a 
similar point when they say that one of the main limitations 
of the current literature on religion and wellbeing is that “the 
studies that have been conducted and the measures that have 
been developed have focused almost exclusively on Chris-
tian samples, and have been geared largely to members of Ju-
deo-Christian traditions” and that “Further empirical studies 
are needed to reveal a clearer picture of the relationship be-
tween religion and health among different religious groups, 
e ecially non-We ern religious traditions” (Abu-Raiya and 
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Pargament, 2012, p. 337; see also Loewenthal, 2007, p. 60; 
Dein, 2006; Pargament et al., 2011, p. 68, 72). 
This bias results in a negative portrayal of SPBEs in re-
lation to mental health, and perhaps e ecially in relation to 
psychosis. For example, in a chapter on schizophrenia Kate 
Loewenthal argues that religious beliefs in general are not 
pathogenic, even though some religious experience shares 
some of the chara eristics of psychosis, and people with psy-
chotic symptoms may be attra ed to religion (Loewenthal, 
2007, p. 11-24). In her discussion of belief in spirits and spir-
it possession  ecifically, however, Loewenthal argues that, 
while belief in spirits and spirit possession do not necessarily 
cause schizophrenia, they are nevertheless terrifying for those 
who believe them, and are certainly likely to exacerbate exist-
ing psychiatric illness (Loewenthal, 2007, p. 32). No mention 
is made of beliefs in benevolent spirits or positive experiences 
of spirit possession. This is in spite of the fact that these too 
can involve (what are psychiatrically defined as) hallucina-
tions, and would therefore seem to be relevant to a discussion 
of schizophrenia. 
Loewenthal’s point in relation to the potential for SP-
BEs to be harmful should not be underrated – for example, 
Wonder, a woman with bipolar disorder, relates going to a 
Charismatic Christian counsellor who told her that “she was 
filled with demons”. She reports that she was “never able to 
get over that experience” and that when she had some psy-
chotic symptoms the counsellor’s words came back to her, 
causing her to feel guilt and dirtiness and to see “demons all 
around” (Wonder, 2006). The horrendous effects of this kind 
of approach need to be not overlooked – but we also need 
to balance this with a recognition that (as I will now argue) 
other SPBEs include beliefs in non-evil spirits and positive 
experiences of spirit possession, and these can have a rather 
different relationship with mental health. 
Not all SPBEs are like the SPBEs discussed by the reli-
gion and mental health literature. For instance, some SPBEs 
in Brazil are heavily influenced by Kardecist Spiritism, which 
often involves the idea that no spirits are evil, though some 
may have bad intentions (Cavalcanti, 1983, p. 39; Dawson, 
2013). To give one example, Umbanda communities typically 
believe in two kinds of spirit who possess. First, spirit-guides, 
who include indigenous people, the spirits of African slaves, 
and the spirits of children, who are at a more advanced stage 
of spiritual development than humans (and thus do not need 
to become incarnate), and who advance further spiritually by 
pra ising acts of charity, including possessing mediums in or-
der to di ense advice. Second, ‘suffering spirits’. These include 
dead people who do not realise they have died, and acciden-
tally possess humans in order to obtain the energy they get 
from food and drink, as well as spirits who know they have 
died, and possess deliberately because they are still attached 
to the earthly plane. Suffering spirits may also include malign 
spirits who are vengeful on account of a (real or perceived) 
grievance caused by the human in a previous life. While in 
Brazil at the time of writing this paper, Umbanda members 
mentioned these spirits when I asked whether any spirits 
were ever evil, and one member replied “maybe not evil, but 
just because people are dead, it doesn’t stop them from being 
complicated”. 
Another Brazilian Spiritist tradition, Santo Daime, 
has been influenced not only by African traditions but also 
the New Age movement, and so in some communities spir-
it-guides include Native American warriors, Celtic (including 
Arthurian and Druidic) figures, and animal spirits (Dawson, 
2013, chapter 4, section 3). While Santo Daime and Umban-
da are very different in many re ects, both emphasise the 
idea of negative spirit possession being caused by suffering or 
disorientated spirits, rather than ones who are evil as such. As 
one medium explains:
Some people have spirits on them and 
don’t know it. What shows is sickness, bad 
feelings and bad things. I had one recently 
which was the spirit of a young man who 
died in an accident… and in his confusion 
attached himself to me. It was not until I was 
in the work [i.e. ritual] that someone else 
identified what was going on and we could 
send him on his way (in Dawson, 2013, 
chapter 4, section 4). 
In Santo Daime, suffering spirits are thought to attach 
themselves “to the energy fields of the spiritually unwary, 
ill-prepared or careless human beings” (Dawson, 2013, chap-
ter 4, section 3). Among other things, liberation from suffer-
ing spirits may involve voluntary possession into a trained 
medium’s body or surrounding aura, in order to send the 
spirit on her or his way to the astral plane. This is described 
in both pedagogical and pastoral terms as ‘instruction’, ‘indoc-
trination’, ‘calming’, and ‘reassuring’ the spirit (Dawson, 2013, 
chapter 4, section 4). The pra ice of mediumship is seen as a 
charitable pra ice (both towards the suffering spirit and the 
possessed human being), and earns the medium cosmic mer-
it (or good karma). These provide a clear counter-example 
to the idea that belief in spirits always refers to belief in evil 
spirits, and that spirit possession is always involuntary, unde-
sirable and distressing – assumptions that are often an a ect 
of negative views of SPBEs. In these Spiritist traditions, spirits 
are usually not evil, and even when they are malign, they tend 
to be understood as analogous to vengeful humans in need of 
discipline and, at times, charity, rather than demonic.
Furthermore, ‘spirit possession’ can refer not only to pos-
session by unhappy and vengeful spirits, but also to benevo-
lent spirit-guides possessing mediums: this is perceived as a 
gift, part of an ongoing positive relationship with the spirit, 
and desirable within a ritual context. This, too, is linked to 
illness and health in what seems at least to be a potentially 
therapeutic way. In some Afro-Brazilian religions such as 
Camdomblé and Umbanda, people often decide to train as 
possession mediums in response to experiences of mental dis-
tress that would have been diagnosed as depression, anxiety 
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or psychosis in other contexts (Seligman, 2014). As Rebecca 
Seligman explains, “Affliction or illness frequently acts as the 
“door” or entry point to Candomblé mediumship” (Seligman, 
2014, p. 69). As Seligman’s study shows, following initiation, 
possession mediums tend to say that their health, and e e-
cially their mental health, improved. 
Thus, it seems there is some reason to think that spir-
it-related pra ices such as possession mediumship may have 
the potential to be therapeutic. While this is the case, the 
ways in which these traditions may and may not be thera-
peutic is more complex than this. Recovery in the straight-
forward clinical sense of a return to the state before illness 
is not usually the primary goal of religious traditions, and to 
interpret them in this way would be reductive and would im-
pose the dominant we ern medical paradigm on them. Thus, 
these religious traditions need to be understood in terms of 
their therapeutic potential, which may go beyond clinical 
outcomes to include a new and transformed state of being. 
As William James puts it in the context of melancholy, people 
who ‘find their way out’, often by religious means, may expe-
rience not a ‘reversion to natural health’, but ‘a deeper kind 
of consciousness than […they] could enjoy before’ ( James, 
2002, p. 156). This is significant for possession mediums, for 
example, whose experiences include not only the alleviation 
or transformation of particular experiences, but also a new 
and meaningful ministry in which they use their mediumship 
to help others. 
While James seems to have an interior spiritual state 
in mind, we should not exclude the possibility that the 
transformation will also have an interpersonal, social or 
even economic chara er. This can be the case particularly 
where religious experiences and consequent roles serve to 
empower a person who has previously not been considered 
important within their society, often because of social injus-
tices on account of their sex/gender and/or socio-economic 
class. Camdomblé possession mediums, who are often from 
very low socio-economic status backgrounds, frequently 
experience a positive reinterpretation of the self, access to 
power and re ect, and access to economic means that (due 
to class and gender issues) are not available through main-
stream economic networks (Seligman, 2005, p. 86). Like-
wise, Frederick Smith relates the case of an Indian woman 
who experienced ongoing bad fortune which she attributed 
to a spirit that had attached itself to her. Following spiritual 
treatment, things not only got better for her: the experience 
also gave rise to transformation in the form of psychic pow-
er and spiritual authority (Smith, 2011, p. 3-17). Therefore, 
the ‘negative’ possession experience was evaluated positively 
when perceived diachronically, because it gave rise to per-
sonal and social kinds of growth that would not be possible 
without it. 
As this indicates, some SPBEs have therapeutic poten-
tial. In order to appreciate this fully we need not only apply 
a clinical understanding of what is ‘therapeutic’ to particular 
situations, though I do not think we should jettison this al-
together. In addition to this, we need to take into account 
the tradition’s understanding of therapeutic concepts (for 
example, healing, salvation, redemption), and also look at 
the broader social consequences of the SPBEs. To this lat-
ter idea, it might be argued that such social and economic 
concerns are irrelevant to therapeutic (clinical and spiritual) 
ones. However, to dismiss such social transformation as of 
secondary importance to spiritual and personal transforma-
tion, or to regard it as irrelevant to clinical and therapeutic 
concerns, overlooks the fact that people are socially and in-
terpersonally constituted, and ignores the social and political 
dimensions of experiences of mental distress that psychiatry 
seeks to alleviate. 
Why are negative perceptions 
of SPBEs practically 
problematic?
I will now turn to the idea that negative perceptions 
of SPBEs are also problematic for practical reasons. This, 
I argue, is because, while the bias in religion and mental 
health studies towards Christianity and Judaism in the 
USA and western European means that we have limited 
evidence about the relationship between other forms of 
SPBEs and mental health, some emerging psychology re-
search suggests that the characteristics we find in some 
SPBEs are therapeutic, contributing to anomalous experi-
ences becoming less pathological or not pathological at all. 
It may seem odd to talk about anomalous experiences such 
as auditory hallucinations being ‘non-pathological’, so I will 
begin by explaining what is meant by ‘pathology’, and why 
it is possible for auditory hallucinations to be (in and of 
themselves) non-pathological. Drawing on the psycholog-
ical studies, I will then discuss five responsive and contex-
tual factors which seem to influence the development of 
anomalous experiences positively, and which are suggestive 
of the therapeutic value of some SPBEs: (i) engaging with 
rather than suppressing or ignoring voices; (ii) believing 
that the voice or presence or spirit is benevolent, and/or 
having a healthy relationship with it; (iii) setting bound-
aries around when voices or spirits are communicated 
with; (iv) making sense of the experience in a positively 
meaningful rather than pathologising or problematising 
way; and (v) having the support of a community, some 
or all of whom share the experience, who validate it, and 
who (where relevant) provide practical support. As I will 
argue these studies indicate, some SPBEs provide helpful 
and therapeutic ways of interpreting certain experiences 
such as those frequently defined as pathological and psy-
chotic by the western society. Following this, I will defend 
the idea that we should see these factors as having a causal 
relationship with psychological wellbeing (and the under-
lying commitment to contextualism) by showing why this 
explanation is preferable to two inherentist alternatives.
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What is pathology, and how could 
hallucinations be non-pathological?
While it is popularly thought that hearing voices, sens-
ing the presence of the dead, and other anomalous experienc-
es occur most commonly in the context of a psychiatric dis-
order such as schizophrenia (Teeple et al., 2009), they are also 
a common experience among people who have no psychiatric 
diagnosis or other indications of pathology (Jackson et al., 
2010; Beaven et al., 2011; Van Os et al., 2009; Loewenthal, 
2007; Steffen and Coyle, 2012). Of these, only a minority are 
diagnosable with schizophrenia or another mental disorder 
(Romme and Escher, 2000; Steffen and Coyle, 2012). This 
is because it is distress and/or loss of occupational or social 
functioning, rather than hallucinations, that are at the heart 
of schizophrenic  ectrum and other disorders according to 
psychiatric definitions of them. For instance, in relation to 
schizophrenia, DSM-5 states:
The characteristic symptoms of schizophre-
nia [delusion, hallucination, disorganised 
speech, negative symptoms or catatonia] 
involve a range of cognitive, behavioral, 
and emotional dysfunctions, but no single 
symptom is pathognomonic [sufficient for a 
diagnosis of pathology] of the disorder. The 
diagnosis involves the recognition of a con-
stellation of signs and symptoms associated 
with impaired occupational or social func-
tioning’ (APA, 2013, p. 100). 
For a significant portion of the time since 
the onset of the disturbance, level of func-
tioning in one or more major areas, such as 
work, interpersonal relations, or self-care, is 
markedly below the level achieved prior to 
the onset (APA, 2013, p. 99).
Both distress and dysfunction are either necessary cri-
teria or else common chara eristics of many mental disor-
ders. For example (focusing on those most relevant to anom-
alous experiences), dysfunction is necessary for, and distress 
a common chara eristic of, schizophrenia, while distress is 
necessary for, and dysfunction associated with, schizophrenic 
affective disorder (APA, 2013, p. 107). Either one of distress 
or dysfunction is necessary for mental disorders such as Sub-
stance/Medication Induced Psychotic Disorder (APA, 2013, 
p. 110), Psychotic Disorder Due To Another Medical Con-
dition (APA, 2013, p. 115), Un ecified and Other Psychotic 
Disorder (APA, 2013, p. 122), Other Specified Schizophre-
nia Spectrum and Other Psychotic Disorder (APA, 2013, 
p. 122), Major Depressive Disorder, which can include psy-
chotic symptoms, and so on (APA, 2013, p. 161). Both the 
general public and psychiatrists can be guilty of pathologising 
by attributing or diagnosing a mental disorder purely on the 
basis of hearing voices (Teeple et al., 2009; Rosenhan, 1973; 
Krippner, 2007). In the absence of distress or dysfunction 
such attributions and diagnoses are mistaken; experiences are 
usually not deemed pathological unless they are marked by 
distress or dysfunction (see Van Os et al., 2009). Indeed, this 
may in fact be reflective of our underlying conception of what 
illness is: as Bill Fulford has argued, agency is a core value of 
medicine, and loss of agency an underlying defining charac-
teristic of both mental and physical illness (Fulford, 1989). 
Consequently, by current psychiatric definition, an au-
ditory hallucination is only likely to be considered patholog-
ical if it is chara erised by distress and/or by dysfunction. 
We might at this point question whether the psychiatric lit-
erature is wise to define pathology in terms of dysfunction 
and distress, and thus to define optimal human existence as 
their absence. In terms of distress, many religious traditions 
have at their hearts other conceptions of optimal human 
existence according which, even if suffering is an inevita-
ble part of human experience, human existence can nev-
ertheless be valuable. For some of these traditions, human 
existence can be valuable despite distress and dysfunction; 
for others they are valuable partly because of it (see Scrut-
ton, 2015, 2016). As I have argued elsewhere, the former 
allows both for the recognition that distress and suffering 
are (all other things being equal) experiences we should seek 
to eradicate and/or alleviate where possible, while balanc-
ing this with the idea that life can be lived well even when 
the elimination of suffering is not possible (Scrutton, 2013, 
2015, 2016). Thus, distress does seem like a sensible way for 
psychiatric literature to chara erise pathology – though 
there is perhaps also the need to re-balance this with a place 
for positive meaning when the elimination of suffering alto-
gether is not possible (see Carel, 2013). 
 Dysfunction is a more complex matter. As the exam-
ple of the Native American woman indicates, there is a risk 
of attributing dysfunction and pathology to behaviour that is 
merely unfamiliar or abnormal by American and European 
standards. Furthermore, because we live in a society that val-
ues a certain kind of function (one chara erised by produc-
tivity) particularly highly, there is a risk that ‘curing’ people 
to make them more functional will make people conform to 
the dominant paradigm – one that not only distrusts differ-
ence but that also perpetuates capitalism and the injustices 
that arise from it. At the same time, the ability to function 
seems to be a good thing in so far as choice and self-determi-
nation are good things, and dysfunction can cause suffering 
not only for social reasons but (arguably) also because of the 
more inherent ways in which some instances of dysfunction 
can limit people’s lives (see Barnes, 2016, chapter 5 for a fuller 
discussion of these issues). 
With these things in mind, I will focus on how particu-
lar features of ways of responding to anomalous experiences 
(whether in the context of SPBEs or in the context of thera-
py interventions) affect pathology qua distress and suffering, 
without also ruling out the possibility that they may also have 
an impact on pathology qua lack of agency and dysfunction. 
Discernment of whether lack of agency and dysfunction are 
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appropriate criteria for pathology needs to be undertaken 
with cultural sensitivity and with some of these wider po-
litical and social issues in mind. However, a fuller discussion 
of this is a task beyond the scope of this paper, and so, while 
pointing to some limitations of the current psychiatric under-
standing of pathology, I do not think it is altogether wrong, 
and broadly presuppose it in what follows. 
Van Os et al.’s large scale review indicates that environ-
mental factors strongly influence whether an anomalous expe-
rience becomes pathological or not (2009). Recent psycholog-
ical studies have focused on environmental (more  ecifically, 
responsive and contextual) factors that seem to have a thera-
peutic effect on anomalous experiences; that is, to diminish or 
pre-empt pathological features of them, such as distress. Some 
of these studies focus on SPBEs (Roxburgh and Roe, 2014) but 
most focus on secular examples or else include religious and 
spiritual examples including SPBEs only incidentally. All are, 
however, relevant to this paper in being suggestive of the poten-
tially therapeutic nature of some SPBEs. 
(i) Engaging with rather 
than repressing voices
Psychiatric treatments traditionally encourage experi-
ents to ignore or suppress rather than engage with the voices, 
and experients are frequently prescribed antipsychotic med-
ication. Such medication is far from entirely effective since 
many people continue to hear distressing voices (Leff et al., 
2013), and it is often accompanied by undesirable side-ef-
fects. The international Hearing Voice Network pioneered 
by Marius Romme and Sandra Escher offers an alternative 
approach by encouraging voice hearers to engage with rath-
er than repress the voices they hear. An important emphasis 
of the Hearing Voices Network is that experients’ own in-
terpretations are re ected and not overridden by patholo-
gising medical or other accounts. Experients’ interpretations 
range from the voice being interpreted as spiritual or para-
normal communication, to it being a psychological but not 
necessarily pathological response to a traumatic event, to it 
being one of the natural variations between different people. 
Romme and Escher themselves tend towards the second of 
these views. Hearing voices, they suggest, is a (non-pathologi-
cal) response to traumatic events and life difficulties, and en-
gaging with the voices is helpful because the voices are links 
with the person’s past. The voices therefore provide a means 
of exploring past events and dealing with these. Ignoring the 
voices and treating them with pharmaceutical drugs consti-
tutes suppressing vital means of healing and growth (Romme 
and Escher, 2000). 
Evaluating the effectiveness of the Hearing Voices ap-
proach depends to some extent on how one measures out-
comes, or how one defines healing and recovery. Some voice 
hearers find they cease to hear voices. Others find the voice 
is no longer distressing or problematic, or even that it can 
become friendly and comforting (Roxburgh and Roe, 2014; 
Vaughan and Fowler, 2004). This is in contrast to suppress-
ing or ignoring the voice, since “…the tendency of individuals 
to react with suspicion and lack of communication with the 
voice… [is] uniquely associated with distress” (Vaughan and 
Fowler, 2004, p. 150). By diminishing or eliminating distress 
caused by voice hearing, this approach of engaging with the 
voices diminishes the pathologisation of the experience in 
two senses: it lessens the likelihood that an experience is di-
agnosed or named as a mental disorder, and (because mental 
disorder is strongly associated with distress) it also diminishes 
the chances that it will be experienced in a pathological way. 
A ects of the Hearing Voices movement are now begin-
ning to be incorporated into mainstream therapies. In 2013, 
a research team at University College London developed a 
computer programme to enable voice hearers who are unre-
sponsive to medication to create an avatar of their voices, in 
order to help hearers engage with the voices (Leff et al., 2013). 
While the long-term clinical outcomes of this approach are 
not yet known, the pilot study found that voices that begin 
as persecutory became more friendly and less intrusive, and 
in some cases disappeared altogether. This development was 
well-documented in UK media, but the portrayal was prob-
lematic, in re ects strikingly similar to mainstream percep-
tions of beliefs in spirits: the phenomenon of voice hearing 
was presented as overwhelmingly negative (with voices being 
dominant and bullying), and the goal of therapy to ‘oppose’ 
and so gain ‘control’ over them (BBC, 2013; The Guardian, 
2013; Daily Mail, 2013). As some of the examples we will dis-
cuss below highlight, this is by no means always the case in 
relation to hearing voices (see Heriot-Maitland, 2013). 
The Hearing Voices Network, avatar therapy and some 
SPBEs share a common response to phenomena such as hear-
ing voices – namely, that voices should be engaged with rather 
than repressed. If this is therapeutic in the context of secular 
treatments such as the Hearing Voices movement and avatar 
therapy, then there is some reason to think that it might be in 
SPBE ones too.
(ii) Whether the voice is regarded 
as benevolent or malevolent, 
and how it is related to
Paul Chadwick and Max J. Birchwood interviewed 
twenty-six people with schizophrenic diagnoses concerning 
their beliefs about the voices they heard. Of these, twelve 
people believed the voices to be malevolent, six benevolent, 
and five (who heard multiple voices) both benevolent and 
malevolent. Ten of the eleven benevolent voices provoked 
positive emotions such as amusement, reassurance, calm and 
happiness, while all seventeen malevolent voices provoked 
negative emotions such as anger, fear, depression and anxiety. 
The exception was a person who responded with anxiety to 
a benevolent voice, probably because the voice issued warn-
ings about possible dangers (Chadwick and Birchwood, 1994, 
p. 192). Chadwick and Birchwood conclude that “The beliefs 
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that voices are benevolent or malevolent adequately explained 
important differences in distress” (Chadwick and Birchwood, 
1994, p. 195). This is relevant to our discussion of SPBEs since, 
as we have already noted, the assumption is often made that 
spirits are malign, but this is by no means always the case. Be-
nevolent spirits can include spirit-guides, saints, ance ors, and 
departed loved ones. These, Chadwick and Birchwood’s study 
seems to indicate, are far less likely to be associated with dis-
tress, and more likely to be associated with positive emotions 
– which are likely to be therapeutic of the experience. 
Other research suggests that, while Chadwick and 
Birchwood are along the right lines, the picture is more com-
plicated than this. In particular, the relationship with the 
voice needs to be perceived diachronically rather than at a 
particular point of time (Vaughan and Fowler, 2004, p. 144). 
For example, Jackson et al. focus on positive rather than neg-
ative experiences of voice hearing, interviewing five people 
who use mental health services and seven people who do not 
(2010). They note that the relationship between voice and 
hearer changed over time, and that a core process for these 
experients was a decline in feelings of fear for the voice, and 
the development of positive feelings such as love and compas-
sion. Thus, for example, compassion-focused therapy encour-
ages people to foster an empathetic attitude to the voice rath-
er than (for example) one in which the hearer engages with 
the voice antagonistically, for example, by trying to switch the 
dominant partner from voice to hearer. In so doing, it enables 
hearers to move to cooperate processes and to feel safe with 
the voice, rather than a ivating the threat-response system, 
which stimulates the amygdala and triggers defences (Heri-
ot-Maitland, email communication, October 12, 2014). A re-
ligious or spiritual tradition that enables the development of 
positive feelings towards the voice may therefore be therapeu-
tic. This is further sugge ed by the fact that, although it was 
not a deliberate focus of the study, all except one of the par-
ticipants of Jackson, Hayward and Cooke’s study (all of whom 
experienced voice hearing positively) belonged to religious or 
spiritual groups, and most of these heard voices they ascribed 
to some kind of spirit (whether of dead relatives, pets, ances-
tors, the voice of nature, or spirit-guides). 
Vaughan and Fowler argue that people’s relationships 
with their voices are analogous to inter-human relationships 
(2004, p. 145). Contrary to their expectations, they found a 
link between submissiveness to the voice, in the context of a 
benevolent voice, and less distress. They concluded that “[…] 
it is not the perceived powerfulness of the voice per se that is 
problematic, but perhaps the way in which the voice is per-
ceived to use its power” (Vaughan and Fowler, 2004, p. 150). 
This seems to resonate with the possession experiences of 
some mediums, who will voluntarily ‘submit’ to the presence 
of a spirit with whom they have developed a relationship. The 
phenomenology of spirit possession varies widely in different 
traditions in relation to consciousness and agency, but in the 
case of at least some Umbanda mediumship, this entails the 
medium giving up consciousness completely and so submit-
ting in a very full sense; that this is desired is indicated by the 
fact that it is experienced as a form of ‘craving’ which must 
not be given in to if the time or context are not right.
(iii) Communicating with spirits 
within chosen boundaries
Studies suggest that being able to choose when and 
where to communicate with voices is important, in terms of 
having a sense of control an enabling the hearer to integrate 
and balance the voice with other a ects of their life ( Jack-
son et al., 2010, p. 489; Roxburgh and Roe, 2014). As Mary, 
a Scientologist voice hearer, puts it in the context of Jackson, 
Hayward and Cooke’s study:
I just say “go away, I’m not going to listen”, 
and if they are persistent, especially if it is a 
[deceased] relative, I will just call my guide 
in, my inspirer and ask “please can you ask 
them [deceased relative] to come back [lat-
er], because it is not appropriate. And they 
have to take notice of you (Jackson et al., 
2010, p. 490-491). 
Other experients who act as mediums in the British 
Spiritualist tradition describe how they set boundaries in the 
context of ritual space; as Sarah puts it:
For me I am working or I am not, you know, 
so it would be absolutely no point spirit 
talking to me unless I’m working... so I am 
not aware of spirit unless I want to be... and 
that depends on the person, if you are an 
open book all of the time then you are go-
ing to feel spirit because our families are 
around us, so you are going to feel them 
but for me that feels unhealthy (Roxburgh 
and Roe, 2014, p. 648). 
Many Umbanda groups have a strong emphasis on disci-
pline, including setting boundaries around when spirit-guides 
can possess. At some rituals trainee mediums sit behind the 
‘full’ mediums and pra ised resisting possession. During the 
ritual spirits are sung in (at which point the medium allows 
the spirit to possess) and sung out again (at which point the 
spirit leaves and the medium’s consciousness returns). 
Voice hearing is often particularly distressing when it is 
intrusive and when the person feels they have no control over 
it. Some SPBEs can enable people to develop mental control 
over when and where intera ion with spirits takes place, and 
to set aside certain times and places for this; in so doing, they 
may help to e ablish boundaries, eliminate feelings of impo-
tence, and enable the person to function in relation to every-
day a ivities. 
In addition to decreasing or eliminating distress and dys-
function, enabling people to control voices is depathologising 
in a second sense. Part of DSM-5’s definition of hallucinations 
is that they are ‘not under voluntary control (APA, 2013, 
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p. 87). While volition is a vague concept and it is difficult in 
particular cases to know whether ‘voluntary’ begins and ‘in-
voluntary’ ends, learning to control voices and set boundaries 
may also be therapeutic by increasing the hearer’s volition in 
relation to the experiences since, in so doing, they can also 
render the term ‘hallucination’ inappropriate, and so locate 
the experience outside the realm of psychiatry and pathology.
(iv) Attributing positive meaning
Jackson et al. note that in their study of people who ex-
perience voices positively:
Most participants felt that their voice-hear-
ing experiences were meaningful and there-
fore sought alternative understandings (of-
ten spiritual) to an illness-based medical 
view. Those who had received a diagnosis 
of mental illness tended to view their voices 
as more than just ‘a bunch of symptoms that 
need fixing’ (Rachel). This often conflicted 
with the medical approach they were of-
fered (Jackson et al., 2010, p. 149). 
This was transformative of their experience since, as one 
person put it, it enabled “[…] understanding what was happen-
ing for me, giving it meaning and breaking down the fear that 
I had around not knowing and thinking that I was a complete 
freak, really different and ill” (in Jackson et al., 2010, p. 492). 
Some SPBEs are a way of providing positive meaning for such 
experiences; for instance, in their study of UK Spiritualist me-
diums, Elizabeth Roxburgh and Chris Roe mention that the 
family context is important in their study’s participants’ identi-
fication with and development of a mediumistic vocation, and 
that “These elements combined to provide a normalising and 
validating function, giving meaning to their experiences and fos-
tering further development” (Roxburgh and Roe, 2014, p. 649).
The quality of an experience can change radically if the 
experience is regarded as having meaning. Of course, this is 
true of negative as well as positive meanings: ‘hallucinatory’ 
experiences that are interpreted as demonic possession as 
a result of sin (as in Wonder’s case) have meaning, but the 
meaning is linked to guilt and a sense of distance from God, 
and the ensuing quality of experience is marked by terror and 
by feelings of shame. In contrast, superficially similar experi-
ences in which a positive meaning is perceived can be marked 
by a sense of peace, wonder and joy as a result. For example, 
Frederick Frese, a retired director of psychology at a public 
psychiatric hospital who has himself been diagnosed with 
schizophrenia relates his experience in the following way:
When, in Milwaukee, I was breaking the 
code of the universe, I discovered the pow-
er of the Trinity as I have come to know it. 
My experience taught me that directly to 
approach the Deity in such a presumptuous 
manner can be fraught with terror and disas-
ter. Such a thing is far too powerful an expe-
rience for a mere mortal to handle. I still have 
a code, of course. You may have noticed that 
I have used a generous sprinkling of sevens, 
twelves, and forties, as well as threes, as I 
constructed this narration. These religiously 
oriented mystical numbers give me little bits 
of joy as I go about any of my work. I know 
that this does not make rational sense, but I 
am most confident that neither I, nor anyone 
else, is a totally rational being. And my ‘se-
cret code’ unlocks innumerable joys for me 
throughout each day (Frese, 1994, p. 25).
In addition to finding joy in his work as a result of the 
meaning he gives it, Frese explains that his own experiences 
have a beneficial effect on his work as a psychologist, making 
him a sign of hope to others diagnosed with schizophrenia 
(for example, by demonstrating that it is possible to have a 
successful career and family life), and by giving him insight 
into their words and behaviour. As this example highlights, a 
positive meaning (which often includes, though is not limited 
to, a positive religious or spiritual meaning) can give rise to 
a richer, more therapeutic experience than a biomedical ac-
count of a phenomenon such as hearing voices is able to do 
on its own (Stanghellini, 2004; Scrutton, 2015). This is true 
whether the experience or condition is something that might 
be temporary or could be ‘cured’, but also if it is not, when a 
broader notion of ‘healing’ is required (Scrutton, 2016).
(v) Community support
Attribution of positive meaning is closely related to com-
munity support, particularly in relation to validating responses 
to the experience. In their 2012 study, Heriot-Maitland et al. 
distinguish factors involved in having an anomalous experience 
from factors involved in such an experience becoming diag-
nosable as pathological. They found that while triggers and the 
initial subjective experience were similar in both clinical and 
non-clinical groups, having the experience validated was asso-
ciated with a non-clinical outcome. This can be illustrated by 
the following two accounts, the first of which is from a clinical 
and the second a non-clinical participant:
[I] relayed this experience to psychiatrists 
in the [hospital] and was sent for EEG tests, 
was told that I was hallucinating, was, this 
guy just didn’t listen to, just obviously hadn’t 
heard anything really that I’d said… I just felt 
that this really positive experience was just 
scrutinised and just not, just liked mocked. I 
didn’t feel offended, I just thought they were 
being really stupid, and disregarding this 
kind of, yeah, really important thing (Holly in 
Heriot-Maitland et al., 2012, p. 46). 
Somebody came up to me and said “well, 
you know, we really need to hear from you. 
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That’s a very powerful message to people, 
and they need to hear that message”. And 
that did matter to me (Clive in Heriot-Mait-
land et al., 2012, p. 47).
As Heriot-Maitland et al. note: 
For the individual who is, perhaps, already 
slightly hesitant about how best to incor-
porate their experience into their social 
worlds, the difference between these two 
interactions could be immense. This seems 
to be the first major difference between C 
[clinical] and NC [non-clinical] groups, who 
until this stage of the report have generally 
reported quite similar experiences (in both 
triggers and subjective nature) (Heriot-Mait-
land et al., 2012, p. 46). 
These and the other findings in the study lead Heri-
ot-Maitland et al. to the conclusion that there is nothing patho-
logical in the experience itself. Rather, the ‘pathology’ seems to 
emerge from the experience “when the meaning of the out of 
ordinary experience is failed to be acknowledged through a lack 
of integration with the inter-personal and background personal 
contexts” (Heriot-Maitland et al., 2012, p. 50; see also Fulford 
and Jackson, 1997). Integration may fail to take place as a result 
of a number of factors, such as fewer multiple appraisal options 
arising from a lack of conceptual and intellectual resources by 
which to make sense of their experiences, and negative respons-
es by people to whom they choose to recount them. 
Some SPBEs, I suggest, pathologise in terms of ‘spiritual’ 
illness (as in the case of Wonder), whereas others provide a pos-
itive interpretation of the experience. That such responses can 
be therapeutic of the experience is indicated by the fact that as 
Seligman notes, people who experienced distress prior to their 
initiation as Candomblé mediums ceased to do so, on account 
of their mediumship role redefining their identity and status 
and providing social support (Seligman, 2005). In addition to 
support at the moral, interpretative level, Krippner argues that 
communities can provide pra ical support such as medium-
ship training, and that in cultures such as the USA in which 
mediumship is regarded as abnormal and training not provid-
ed, mediums are more likely to exhibit pathological symptoms 
(Krippner, 2008). This indicates that community support, such 
as that found in some SPBEs, can be therapeutic in relation to 
anomalous experiences, in the sense of providing a positive in-
terpretive and pra ical framework, and so helping to prevent 
the experience from becoming pathological.
Is the contextualist view justified? 
Avoiding a circular argument
The studies of responsive and contextual factors support 
the contextualist view, which regards anomalous experiences 
and other mental states as pathologically indeterminate, with 
pathology emerging as a result of responsive and contextual 
factors. However, my discussion of these studies, and, to the 
extent that they propose a causal relationship, these studies 
themselves, have also presupposed a contextualist view by not 
explicitly considering other, non-contextual, ways of inter-
preting the findings. In order to avoid a circular argument, I 
therefore need to consider these and argue that we have rea-
sons to prefer a contextualist view over them. In so doing, I 
hope to contribute to future studies and discussions that sup-
port contextualism by showing why contextualism should be 
preferred to inherentist ways of interpreting the evidence. 
One alternative explanation to the contextualist view is 
that the studies that discuss which responsive and contextual 
factors determine whether the person receives a clinical diag-
nosis do not in fact indicate anything about whether the ex-
perience has become pathological. They simply indicate that 
such responsive and contextual factors mean that a patholog-
ical experience remains undiagnosed because the contextual 
factors mean that the experient does not visit a psychiatrist 
(e.g. because they visit a spiritual healer or join the Hearing 
Voices Network instead). On this view, anomalous experience 
AE1 would be diagnosed if person P1 saw a psychiatrist; the 
fact that P1 does not see a psychiatrist does not mean that it 
is not pathological, but simply that it is not diagnosed as such. 
It is possible that AE1 could be pathological but undiagnosed, 
provided that one accept that an anomalous experience’s be-
ing pathological does not depend on it being named (via diag-
nosis) as such. However, whether one does accept this or not, 
this does not seem to be the case with most of the positively 
experienced anomalous experiences described in the studies. 
The reason for this relates to the fact that, as we saw above, 
distress (and also dysfunction) are common features of, and 
frequently necessary conditions for, diagnosis of a mental dis-
order such as schizophrenia. Because the positive experiences 
described in the studies are not chara erised by distress (or 
dysfunction), a diagnosis of pathology would not only be less 
likely in pra ice because they would be less likely to visit a 
psychiatrist. It would also be inappropriate in theory, because 
of what the idea of pathology involves. Therefore, a causal and 
contextualist explanation is to be preferred to this alternative.
A second alternative explanation is that the responsive 
and contextual factors examined in the studies are a correlate 
rather than a cause of the pathological status of the anoma-
lous experience. According to this argument, AE1 is inherent-
ly non-pathological, and P1’s experience and interpretation 
of it as non-pathological and, say, spiritually transformative, 
reflects rather than causes its non-pathological status, and is 
reflected in the responses of people around her. In contrast, 
AE2 is inherently pathological, giving rise to P2’s pathological 
experience of it, as recognised by the people around him. 
This alternative differs from the first inherentist alter-
native, in part because the former tends towards the idea 
that all anomalous experiences are inherently pathological, 
whereas the latter tends towards the idea that some anom-
alous experiences are inherently pathological (in origin and 
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potential) while others are not, perhaps being inherently 
spiritual or mystical instead. While there is no necessary re-
lationship between this view and the idea that religious and 
spiritual categories are natural kinds (or between contextu-
alism and social kinds [see Fulford and Jackson, 1997]), this 
view is likely to make an appeal to two fundamentally differ-
ent natural kinds of anomalous experience – the pathologi-
cal, and the religious. I think this kind of distinction should 
be rejected, not only in relation to natural kinds, because 
(as already noted) there is no basis for it, but also because 
(whether construed in terms of natural or social kinds) it 
seems to raise more questions than it answers (what is meant 
by ‘religious’ and where do religious anomalous experiences 
come from and why? Why are they so similar to pathological 
ones in terms of trigger and initial subjective experience?). 
This kind of account would also need to account for vari-
ous features of the studies’ findings, without appealing to 
naturalistic causes: for example, that experiences can cease 
to be pathological when the person begins to make sense of 
them in a positive way (e.g. Roxburgh and Roe, 2014, p. 647; 
Rachel in Jackson et al., 2010, 2004; Seligman, 2005, above), 
the effectiveness of cognitive behaviour therapies that focus 
on challenging people’s beliefs (Wykes et al., 2008; Gaudia-
no, 2006; Cormac et al, 2004), and the fact that knowledge 
of multiple appraisal options is positively associated with 
non-pathological status (see Heriot-Maitland et al., 2012). 
Appealing to divine intervention – a deity who blesses the 
pra itioners of a number of different religions (along with 
members of the Hearing Voices Network) with positively 
meaningful anomalous experiences superficially similar to 
naturally-arising pathologies, who changes experiences to 
the non-pathological variety in the event of religious conver-
sion or a change in non-religious beliefs, and who be ows 
a knowledge of multiple appraisals or ways of interpreting 
the experience on his preferred people – would be possible. 
However, here we are left with a rather odd-looking deity, 
and it seems to me that this explanation is less intuitive and 
more complicated than the idea that interpretations causally 
affect inherently indeterminate experiences. 
In addition to these reasons, I suggest, there is also a 
pra ical reason for preferring a contextualist view to an in-
herentist one. A contextualist view leaves open the possibility 
that experiences diagnosed as pathological have the potential 
to be or become (in addition, or instead) a positive religious-
ly- or spiritually-construed experience, while inherentist ones 
exclude this possibility. Conversely, a contextualist view al-
lows for the possibility of experients making sense of their ex-
periences in both religious and medical terms, and benefiting 
from both forms of therapy (see Scrutton, 2015). Giving this 
kind of hope, and allowing both forms of therapy, are only 
likely to be effective if contextualism is true (if anomalous ex-
periences really are pathologically indeterminate); if contex-
tualism is not true, then giving such hope is futile. However, 
if contextualism is true but it is assumed that inherentism is 
true, experients are deprived of hope and potentially ther-
apeutic forms of treatment: people whose experiences are 
deemed ‘pathological’ would be deprived of the idea that their 
experience could also have spiritual value, and of religious 
and spiritual forms of therapy, and people whose experiences 
are deemed ‘religious or spiritual’ deprived of medical or psy-
chological therapies. Working on the basis of contextualism 
would therefore seem to be therapeutic if true, and neutral 
(neither therapeutic nor pathogenic) if false; working on the 
basis of inherentism would be neutral if true, but damaging if 
false. This means we have a pra ical as well as an intellectual 
reason to prefer contextualism.
Conclusion
In conclusion, I have argued that negative assumptions 
about SPBEs in the West are problematic, both because they 
erroneously extrapolate a ects of some SPBEs to all SPBEs, 
and because they discourage people from SPBEs and so shut 
down a potentially therapeutic avenue. This does not entail 
a stance that is pro-religion or pro-SPBE per se: other SPBEs 
such as those experienced by Wonder, in common with some 
other religious beliefs, can be extremely harmful. At the same 
time, this paper suggests, we ern society might have some-
thing to learn from certain SPBEs with re ect to anomalous 
experiences and other forms of human experience. In addi-
tion to this, I have provided a philosophical basis for the idea 
that pathology emerges in anomalous experiences as a result 
of responsive and contextual factors, defending this claim 
against the alternative idea that pathology is inherent in all, 
or some, anomalous experiences, regardless of the context or 
culture in which they are interpreted.
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